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From:
David Post <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
David Post <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Fri, 13 Mar 2015 16:29:14 -0400
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Mine as well
David


At 04:14 PM 3/13/2015, Walid AL-SAQAF wrote:

>Pleased to add my name Kathy.
>
>Sincerely,
>
>Walid
>On Mar 13, 2015 7:13 PM, "Kathy Kleiman" 
><<mailto:[log in to unmask]>[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>Dear All,
>Attached please find an important set of 
>comments. They are to the Whois Accuracy Pilot 
>Study Report  by a group oof researchers at the 
>University of Chicago called NORC. Buried in 
>this report turns out to be a many issues 
>important to us in the Whois domain name 
>registration databases  including the quesstion 
>of postal addresses (should we be validating and 
>publishing the physical addresses of political 
>dissident groups, religious minorities, girls’ 
>schools in areas where many do not like girls 
>education?  Is there a danger to be evaluated 
>*before* we undertake this new policy?)
>
>Identity Validation is a very open question as 
>well, yet NORC seems ready to start work in this 
>area. I have written a set of questions that say 
>STOP  and let’s consider the policy 
>iimplications of these acts before we develop 
>plans to put them into effect. The comments are 
>below (with a full copy attached).
>
>They are due tonight!  If you can sign on, 
>please do. Please let me know your name and/or organization and/or country.
>
>Great tx to Stephanie Perrin for editing! Here 
>are some thoughts of members on our Policy Committee: 
>-         Kathy’s drafted, what I 
>believe to be, an excellent comment in response.  Amr Elsadr
>-         Great job Kathy!!  I support 
>this document.  -- Stephanie Perrin
>-         Feel free to add my name as 
>endorsing the document  Ed Morris
>
>Best and tx!!
>Kathy (Kleiman)
>
>WHOIS Accuracy Pilot Study Report
>Burying Extremely Divisive Policy Questions in a 
>Technical Implementation Report Written by an 
>ICANN Contractor is Improper and, in this Case, Dangerous
>These are comments written in response to the 
>WHOIS Accuracy Pilot Study Report.  Buried in 
>this Report  which purports to be an 
>implementation report of an ICANN Contractor 
>(NORC/University of Chicago) -- are some of the 
>most controversial and unsettled issues in ICANN 
>policy discussions and history. These issues are 
>the subject of deep and bitter divides over many 
>years of ICANN work, the subject of interest 
>across the world, and the focus of a series of 
>explosive comments in Singapore when the ICANN 
>Community began to realize what was happening.
>
>It is inappropriate in the extreme, for ICANN 
>policy issues to be buried in a ICANN 
>Contractor’s implementation report, and even 
>further, deep in its Appendix B, Next Steps for 
>the Development of the WHOIS Accuracy Report 
>System (ARS).   This follows pages of study 
>“methods and approach” language and sample 
>design which are obscure even to those who 
>follow Whois policy issues on a regular 
>basis.  We submit that after the many years of 
>heated controversy over this topic, it is 
>disingenuous at the very least to allow this to 
>happen policy debate to continue its development in this manner.
>We are deeply concerned that ICANN Staff has not 
>flagged this Report, or this Comment Proceeding, 
>for what it appears to be  a process to seek 
>permission from the ICANN Community for the:
>
>a)      wholesale checking of the physical 
>addresses of online speakers across the world 
>(whether using domain names for political 
>speech, personal speech, or religious, ethnic or 
>sexual minority expression) thus creating an 
>unprecedented inextricable link between a 
>speaker and her physical location, and
>
>b)      the radical new concept of Identity 
>Validation for each and every domain name 
>Registrant to the ICANN Community, a concept 
>with inconceivable implications for political, 
>ethnic and religious minorities worldwide, as 
>well as entrepreneurs, emerging organizations 
>and those operating today without identities who seek to create them.
>
>We respectfully add the issues below to this debate.
>
>I.       ICANN has never been given a 
>mandate for Address Checking on a Massive Scale
>Although the Contractor’s Report seems to 
>suggest that the ICANN Community has approved 
>the massive checking of postal addresses in the 
>existing gTLD Whois databases, that is not the case.
>
>A.     The Whois Review Team Final Report 
>set the standard of “contactability” -- 
>reaching the domain name registrant with 
>questions and concerns  not absolute accuracy of alll data in the whois
>The Current NORC Study (2014) and its 
>accompanying ICANN Staff Summary accompanying 
>this NORC’s Pilot Report misrepresent the 
>WHOIS Policy Review Team Final Report and its 
>Recommendations.  The goal of the Whois Review 
>Team was “Contactibility” and 
>“Reachability” of the Registrant. To this 
>end WHOIS Policy Review Team Final Report looked 
>“holistically” at the Whois record and did 
>not seek the accuracy of each and every element 
>of a Registrant’s Whois record.
>
>Specifically, the NORC Report of 2009/2010 (an 
>earlier report called the NORC Data Accuracy 
>Study) created five categories for ranking the 
>data quality of a Whois record: Full Failure 
>(overwhelmingly inaccurate); Substantial Failure 
>(most data inaccurate); Limited Failure (data to 
>some degree present and considered useful); 
>Minimal Failure (may benefit from additional 
>information, but data provided is accurate) and 
>No Failure (data complete and accurate).
>
>The Whois Review Team called for ICANN to 
>significantly reduce the number of “Full 
>Failure” and “Substantial Failure” Whois 
>Records --- Avoidance of “No Failure” was 
>not a goal at all.  As shared many times in 
>meetings of the Whois Review Team and members of 
>the ICANN Community, including the GAC, what the 
>WHOIS Review Team recommended was that Whois 
>information be sufficiently available and 
>accurate for the Registrant to be reached for 
>legitimate technical, administrative and other 
>questions: [Recommendation] “6. ICANN should 
>take appropriate measures to reduce the number 
>of WHOIS registrations that fall into the 
>accuracy groups Substantial Failure and Full 
>Failure (as defined by the NORC Data Accuracy 
>Study, 2009/10) by 50% within 12 months and by 
>50% again over the following 12 months.”
>
>Thus, for the Whois Review Team, “No 
>Failure” (full accuracy of all fields) was not 
>the goal;  “contactability” and “reachability” of Registrants was.
>        B. 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement
>
>The WHOIS Review Team Final Report noted that 
>efforts were already underway to improve 
>accuracy and contactibility of Registrants in 
>the then-pending “direct negotiations with 
>Registrars on revisions to the RAA.” These 
>negotiations resulted in the 2013 RAA which 
>furthered the goal of reaching Registrants 
>through verified phone numbers and email addresses:
>            1.f : “Verify:
>                        
>                      
>  i.      the email address of the 
>Registered Name Holder (and, if different, the 
>Account Holder) by sending an email requiring an 
>affirmative response through a tool-based 
>authentication method such as providing a unique 
>code that must be returned in a manner designated by the Registrar, or
>                        
>                      ii. 
>     the telephone number of the Registered 
>Name Holder (and, if different, the Account 
>Holder) by either (A) calling or sending an SMS 
>to the Registered Name Holder's telephone number 
>providing a unique code that must be returned in 
>a manner designated by the Registrar, or (B) 
>calling the Registered Name Holder's telephone 
>number and requiring the Registered Name Holder 
>to provide a unique code that was sent to the 
>Registered Name Holder via web, email or postal mail.
>As with the Final Report of the Whois Review 
>Team, the goal of the 2013 RAA was 
>“contactability” and “reachability” of 
>the domain name Registrant for technical or 
>administrative questions by third parties.
>C.     Where Did the “No Failure” 
>Standard Come From for NORC  the Validaation 
>and Verification of Each and Every Whois Element 
>Without Policy Processes or Assessments of the Risks and Harms?
>Consistent with the Whois Review Team Final 
>Report and the 2013 RAA, we can understand the 
>NORC methodology and approach to checking email 
>addresses and telephone numbers  but postal 
>address validation?  Where is the underlying 
>GNSO Policy driving this direction to NORC from ICANN Staff?
>Where is the assessment of the risks and 
>benefits of updating the physical addresses of 
>hundreds of millions of political, personal, 
>religious, ethnic and sexual speakers  
>including dissidents, minorities and those 
>discriminated against by the laws and customs of 
>various regions?  Where is NORC evaluating the 
>wholesale and massive verification of postal 
>address in the existing gTLD WHOIS databases 
>without such an assessment?  How did ICANN Staff come to direct it?
>
>The NORC Contractor seems to have jumped from 
>the logical  checking email and phone  to 
>checking physical addresses.  But this leap 
>from an open and undecided policy question to a 
>mere implementation issue should be disturbing 
>to everyone in the ICANN Community. What we know 
>from history and the most tragic of recent 
>events is that speech and physical location are a dangerous combination.
>
>When individuals armed with automatic rifles 
>wish to express their disagreement with the 
>legal speech of a satirical magazine, they find 
>the location in Paris and kill writers, 
>publishers and cartoonists.  When they want to 
>express contempt for those practicing another 
>religion, they bring their guns to kosher 
>grocery stores in Paris and synagogues in 
>Copenhagen. Tracking down and beheading 
>Christian minorities is a horror of daily life in some parts of the world.
>
>The UN Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, states:
>Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
>expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
>opinions without interference and to seek, 
>receive and impart information and ideas through 
>any media and regardless of frontiers.
>It does not say that everyone must put their 
>address on that speech. Where, as here, the 
>Internet has become the major path of 
>communication for that speech, the requirement 
>of a physical address for every speaker may well 
>violate the requirement of the right to speak 
>and the protection for that expression.
>
>Further, the validation of postal addresses 
>represents a major change of policy  one not 
>mandated or requested byy the Whois Review Team, 
>the 2013 RAA or by any Policy-Development Team we know of.
>Who has evaluated the impact and dangers of 
>wholesale adoption of postal address validation 
>of the long-existing gTLD Whois databases 
>especially in a world that has changed 
>dramatically in the last few years  where 
>entire governments have risen and fallen, where 
>formerly free countries and regions are enslaved 
>by terrorist organizations and a new set of 
>dictators? While proxy/privacy registrations are 
>available, they are a costly luxury for many and completely unknown to others.
>
>The mandatory validation of the massive number 
>of postal addresses in the gTLD Whois database  
>as appears to be tthe policy proposal buried 
>between methodology and sample sizes in the 
>Contractor’s report -- will result in the 
>dangerous, harmful, even life-threatening 
>exposure of those using their domain names for 
>nothing more than communicating their ideas, 
>concerns, political hopes, and religious 
>meetings via private streams of domain name 
>communications, such as on listservs and email 
>addresses, and more public resources including websites and blogs.
>
>No policy we know has ever directed ICANN Staff 
>to instruct a Contractor to engage in massive 
>Postal Address Validation – and no policy 
>development process we know has studied, 
>weighed, debated or valued the enormous impact 
>to speech and expression of going back over 25+ 
>years of domain names registrations to suddenly 
>“correct” the postal address and thereby 
>expose battered women’s shelters, women’s 
>schools in Pakistan, pro-democracy groups, 
>family planning groups and LBGQT locations worldwide.
>
>If this is the policy we in ICANN choose to 
>adopt in the future (as we certainly have NOT 
>adopted it already), then it will require 
>enormous amounts of preparation, notice and warning to gTLD domain name
>registrants on a global scale.  Absent that, we 
>know (without doubt or hyperbole) that ICANN will have blood on its hands.
>Overall, ICANN’s Contractor NORC seems to have 
>jumped into policy-making, not mere implementation.
>
>II.       Identity Validation  Really?
>
>Buried deep in Appendix B, of the Contractor’s 
>Report, behind “syntactic accuracy” and 
>“operational accuracy” is the explosive 
>issue of “exploring accuracy from an identity perspective” (page 45).
>At no time has ICANN ever held a Policy 
>Development Processes on Identity Validation. 
>Accordingly, where does this guidance from ICANN 
>to its Contractor to explore identity validation 
>implementation come from?  For those who 
>attended the public Whois meeting in LA, this 
>issue certainly was not flagged in the 
>discussion; for those who attended the public 
>meeting in Singapore, this issue was introduced 
>and IMMEDIATELY FLAGGED as intensely controversial and divisive.
>
>Identity validation of those engaged in freedom 
>of expression, publishing and political 
>discussion is a deeply controversial prospect  
>and one wwith heartfelt objection and opposition 
>grounded in history and law.  The United 
>States, for example, sought to be free of 
>England in part because of the mandatory 
>licensing of its printing presses  and the 
>arrest of alll who published objections to 
>actions of the English crown.  Pamphlets issued 
>without names and addresses are not just a 
>cultural right in the US, but a constitutional 
>one.  McIntyre vs. Ohio Elections Commission, 
>514 U.S. 334 (US Supreme Court, 1995). 
>
>A.     The GAC asked for a weighing of the risks and benefits
>We note that the GAC has not issued policy in 
>this area.  According to the “Brief 
>Overview” provided by ICANN as introduction to 
>this Contractor Report and this public comment 
>period, the GAC “asked for an assessment of 
>the feasibility, costs and benefits of 
>conducting identity validation as part of the development of the ARS.”
>
>Nowhere in this report do we see any assessment 
>of the costs, delays, risks and harms that might 
>be incurred by gTLD Registrants, Registrars and 
>Registries worldwide if identity validation were 
>adopted. Nowhere do we even see an analysis of 
>how identity validation takes places, what 
>happens when a minority seeks to register, or 
>when a speaker must disclose and show her 
>identification as the cost of signing up for a 
>domain name highlighting family planning, women 
>rights, or women’s education in parts of the 
>world not as conducive to these fundamental 
>rights and basic principles.  Must she go through her father for this too?
>
>B.     ICANN has promised a policy making process.
>In his response to the GAC on this issue, Dr. Crocker noted concerns:
>The costs of operating the Accuracy Reporting System are largely dependent
>upon the number of WHOIS records to be examined, as well as the level of
>validation (syntactic, operational, or identity). For example, the initial
>responses to the ICANN RFP reveal that identity validation services are both
>costly and difficult to administer on a global basis. There may also be data
>protection and privacy issues of concern to the community when conducting
>extensive identity validation on WHOIS records. Hence, the costs of
>completing the development of Phase 3 will be determined based on
>engagement with the community to identify the appropriate level of identity
>validation for ICANN to conduct, as well as the costs associated with
>performing identity validation on a global 
>scale. 
>(<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-to-dryden-02sep14-en.pdf>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-to-dryden-02sep14-en.pdf, 
>emphasis added.)
>
>As always, policy development must proceed 
>implementation. We call on ICANN to take this 
>discussion out of the recesses of a Contractor 
>report, and into the light of the policy development process.
>
>        III. Wide Outreach Needed
>One thing the Whois Review Team did note in its 
>Final Review is the need for clear and concerted 
>outreach on issues that impact the Whois: “We 
>found great interest in the WHOIS policy among a 
>number of groups that do not traditionally 
>participate in ICANN’s more technical 
>proceedings.  They include the law enforcement 
>community, Data Protection Commissioners, and 
>the privacy community more generally.”  The 
>Whois Review Team’s recommendation 
>specifically call for active and concerted 
>outreach to these communities of its issue:
>Recommendation 3 - Outreach
>ICANN should ensure that WHOIS policy issues are 
>accompanied by cross-community outreach, 
>including outreach to the communities outside of 
>ICANN with a specific interest in the issues, 
>and an ongoing program for consumer awareness.
>
>That has clearly not happened here  when so 
>much of substancee is buried so deeply in the 
>back of a report. When will ICANN be undertaking 
>clear, robust global Outreach on these important 
>freedom of expression and privacy issues and implications?
>
>IV.              Finally, let’s 
>Add Policy Staff and Freedom of Expression and Data Protection Expertise
>We ask that an ICANN Staff deeply steeped in 
>data protection and freedom of expression laws 
>and rights be brought on to work on the 
>development of these address and identity 
>issues. We understand that ICANN feels previous 
>backgrounds of its staffers do not limit their 
>activities, but the perception and reality of 
>this issue would be considered much more 
>balanced if the ICANN Staffers of the project 
>hailed from an array of backgrounds and had 
>represented multiple sides of this issue in their prior lives.
>
>V.                 Conclusion
>We can’t bury wholesale physical address 
>checking and the new concept of identity 
>validation in the back of a Contractor Report.  
>These are NOT policies examined or endorsed by 
>the whole of the ICANN or even the GNSO 
>communities, nor policies evaluated yet by the 
>whole of the ICANN Community. The risks and 
>benefits must be assessed before the implementation is planned.
>
>Signed,
>
>MEMBERS OF THE NONCOMMERCIALS STAKEHOLDERS GROUP
>[name, and/or organization, and/or country]

*******************************
David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation
blog (Volokh Conspiracy) http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post
book (Jefferson's Moose)  http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n
music http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic 
publications etc.  http://www.davidpost.com
*******************************  

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