From: [log in to unmask] [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Joly MacFie

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2015 3:19 PM

To: Milton L Mueller

Cc: ncsg-discuss

Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Ominous update on the IANA transition





On Thu, May 7, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Milton L Mueller <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:

If there is separability, then the moment IANA stops doing what it is supposed to do one can fire the operator and find someone who will conform to the contract and implement the community-based policies.



​You mean ICANN? Or am I missing something?



MM: Yes, you are missing that the CWG proposal would split off IANA from ICANN as a separate affiliate. The point of separating IANA and ICANN is to create an arms length relationship, and a contract, between the policy maker (ICANN) and the entity that makes updates and changes in the root zone to implement the policies. If ICANN is BOTH policy maker AND in control of the root, then  there is no contract and no open, transparent relationship between ICANN and IANA.

​

​CW's point is that, if separate, what's to stop anyone with a billion dollars ​hijacking it for their own agenda?



MM: This shows that CW, and you, still don’t understand what IANA does. Sorry to put it bluntly, but there is a mystique about it that is a real impediment to rational discussion, and that is the idea that Whoever controls IANA controls the Internet or, less ludicrously, the DNS root and all policies related to it. In fact, IANA is a registry for protocols, names and numbers. It edits the root zone file for DNS. The changes it makes are supposed to come from policy maker.



But IANA can’t make the policy (if it is under contract to ICANN) and it doesn’t even control the master root zone file. It just edits and updates the file and sends it on to Verisign.



This idea of capturing IANA is truly ridiculous if IANA is just a separate entity that has a contract from the policy maker to edit the root zone file and pass the changes on. No one would bother to capture it because if IANA didn’t do what its contract said it must do (implement community policies) it will no longer be used as the IANA, and/or its changes would not be implemented by Verisign. There is nothing to capture there. IANA itself has no asset of value, and the contract if put out on the market could probably be performed for less than $3 million.



On the other hand, if ICANN controls IANA and they are vertically integrated and inseparable, you have a very strong incentive to go after control of the whole thing, because then you will control things.



Presumably the ICANN board is assumed to be harder to hijack because of established accountability checks and balances. Why duplicate all that?  Just asking.



MM: If you don’t think you can hijack ICANN then how would IANA, which is its contractor, be hijacked?



Also, why is the IAB not a good candidate?



MM: candidate for what? IAB is ALREADY in a contractual relationship with IANA, they are NOT AT ALL afraid it wll be taken over. The numbers people also want a separable, contractual relationship. Tell me why names is different. And hint: don’t ask CW. He doesn’t understand the difference.