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NCSG-Discuss <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 11 Aug 2014 11:13:14 -0400
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Avri Doria <[log in to unmask]>
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Hi,

I have made a few edits to the document to reflect the comments by
Nicolas and Carlos.

avri



DRAFT
Proposed NCSG Statement on ICANN Staff’s Accountability Plan  v.02

The NCSG appreciates this opportunity to provide feedback regarding the
ICANN Staff’s non-stakeholder led proposal for further work on
“Enhancing Accountability” at ICANN.

A number of public comments and discussions in London focused on the
inherent conflict of interest behind staff developing its own
accountability mechanisms, so it was surprising to see that input had
not been taken into account by staff in the development of this
proposal. NCSG notes its disappointment with the staff having skipped
the step of providing a synthesis of the community feedback received
from the ICANN public comments forum and the London accountability
discussions. Staff had stated it was working on this during GNSO Council
and SO/AC leadership calls since the London meeting, and that was over a
month ago; normally, staff can produce a synthesis of a comment period
within a week, so we are at a loss to explain this delay.  NCSG
reiterates its request to see the synthesis of public input upon which
staff relied in the formulation of its accountability proposal.  It is
impossible to know where the components of staff’s proposal come from
and on what basis they are called for without being privy to staff’s
assessment of the public input on the subject. It is difficult to find
those elements in the written comments.  At a time when the world is
indeed watching ICANN to discern if it can be trusted without NTIA
oversight of its global governance functions, and is particularly
interested in the formulation of a proposal for resolving ICANN’s
accountability crisis, to skip the step of providing the rationale for
staff’s proposal, including its basis in the community’s stakeholder
comments, seems imprudent at best.  From its inception, the community
should have been engaged in the formulation of the proposal on the
table, not pressured into signing-off on a staff proposal at the 11th
hour.  This is an example of top-down policymaking, which runs counter
to ICANN’s bottom-up methodology and may inspire mistrust on the part of
the stakeholders.

Regarding the substance of the staff proposal, the NCSG does not support
it as currently drafted.  Of particular concern is the proposed
Community Coordination Group, which would prioritize issues identified
by the community and build solutions for those issues.  As proposed by
staff, this group is too heavily controlled by the ICANN board and staff
and as such it replicates the problem of ICANN’s accountability
structures being circular and lacking independence.  Given the
overwhelming number of public comments submitted supporting the need for
an independent accountability mechanisms, it is unclear on what basis
ICANN staff proposed a solution in which the ICANN board and staff would
fill a large number of the seats on the CCG.  It is also unclear on what
basis staff thinks board-picked advisors should have an equal voice as
representatives of community members.  Outside experts are welcome and
can provide valuable input, but they should be selected by and report to
the community, not the board or staff for independent accountability to
be achieved.  And advisors’ role must be clarified as an informational
role, rather than a decision making role that representatives of
stakeholder interests would hold in a bottom-up process.  It is also
necessary that the role of any ICANN board or staff on this CCG serve in
a non-decision making, support or liaison function.   For the CCG to
have legitimacy as a participatory form of democracy, the
decision-making members must consist of stakeholders, not the ICANN
board and staff.  The make-up, roles and responsibilities of the members
of the proposed CCG must be reformulated in a more bottom-up fashion by
the community for this proposal to be acceptable.

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