I want to join the voices of Matthew Shears, Bill Drake, and James
Gannon here on the downside risks of delay.
There are always risks to any change but the fabric of this change is
strong enough (and flexible enough) to deal with most stresses. During
yesterday's Senate hearing there were excellent presentations by many
and good questions by some. But, there were areas where it was clear
that the Senators do not fully understand, and areas where ICANN has to
explain things with more clarity.
There was confusion between notions of a fragmented Internet and the
impacts of national policy. The risk of delay is that national
governments will either move to transfer ICANN's remit to another UN or
multilateral organization, which would be bad in that it exposes the
core DNS stability and security remit to a political domain. That is why
delay is risky, but this is confounded by what I see as some confusion
resulting from an inadequate recognition of the differences between the
notion of "fragmentation of the Internet" within ICANN's DNS remit, and
differential Internet ecosystem policies in different countries. It is
important that this difference be understood. We may care about both but
where core DNS policy making resides should be clearly differentiated
and understood.
Much of regulation, including much around the broadly defined "net
neutrality" may differ from country to country, some with good policy
and some with bad policy. This is not "fragmentation" within ICANN's
remit, it is differential national policy. ICANN could elect to show
leadership and advocate for a sort of best in class high ethical ground
position about "net neutrality" but that would be ICANN community
advocacy outside ICANN's core remit. That would not compromise ICANN's
benefit corporation remit.
However, what needs to be made clear here is that a concern with
"fragmentation of the Internet" is within the security, stability..and
connectedness.. of the DNS system itself, and not those areas of policy
that will always reside within the policy remit of national governments,
and result in good, bad, or terrible domestic policy. The Senator's
question about "Net Neutrality" suggested the need for more clarity here.
Lastly, another Senator asked "what is broken", and countered with the
principle that "If it ain't broken don't fix it". This too was a
misunderstanding of the intent of the transition, and this needs to be
explained more clearly. I suspect that many of the questions were
prompted by a sense of "Well, if I don't understand this well, and we
'own' it, lets not give it away". The reality there, as well put by some
speakers, is that the U.S. does not own it in any event, it is simply
"out there". What is being handed over to wider stewardship is
oversight, being handed over to a very public and transparent process
where any constituency, including governments, can ring an alarm bell
should policy impacting on the security, stability...and
connectedness..." of the DNS system start to wobble on its axis, nothing
more and nothing less.
Get this transition behind us and let constituencies return to worrying
about what their respective governments are up to with regard to
Internet ecosystem policy at home, or the harmonization, or
fragmentation, of those policies in UN and multilateral settings. That
is where the next big struggles will occur and they are beyond the ICANN
DNS remit.
Sam L.
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